Reference:
N. Groot,
B. De Schutter, and
H. Hellendoorn,
"Achieving system-optimal splitting rates in a freeway network using a
reverse Stackelberg approach," Proceedings of the 13th IFAC
Symposium on Control in Transportation Systems (CTS'2012), Sofia,
Bulgaria, pp. 132-137, Sept. 2012.
Abstract:
A game-theoretical method is proposed to achieve a system-optimal
distribution of traffic over a freeway network. In particular, the
road authority is represented by a leader player and each follower
player embodies a group of drivers with the same value of time that
plan to travel between a given origin and destination. In the proposed
reverse Stackelberg approach, the leader presents a function to each
follower that maps a vector of splitting rates over possibles routes
to a monetary incentive. The follower then decides upon a splitting
rate and the associated monetary incentive that yield the minimum
weighted measure of travel time and monetary fees. In this manner, the
road authority can compose an optimal leader function under which the
followers will behave as desired, i.e., to achieve the system-optimal
splitting rates.