Reference:
Z. Su,
S. Baldi, and
B. De Schutter,
"Optimal nonlinear solutions for reverse Stackelberg games with
incomplete information," Proceedings of the 55th IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control, Las Vegas, Nevada, pp. 5304-5309, Dec.
2016.
Abstract:
The reverse Stackelberg game provides a suitable decision-making
framework for hierarchical control problems like network pricing and
toll design. We propose a novel numerical solution approach for
systematic computation of optimal nonlinear leader functions, also
known as incentives, for reverse Stackelberg games with incomplete
information and general, nonconcave utility functions. In particular,
we apply basis function approximation to the class of nonlinear leader
functions, and treat the incentive design problem as a standard
semi-infinite programming problem. A worked example is provided to
illustrate the proposed solution approach and to demonstrate its
efficiency.